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We assess the value of critical infrastructure by modeling system
function. We assume when system components fail, or are inten-
tionally damaged, the surviving components will be operated in an
intelligent fashion to maximize residual function. In some infrastruc-
ture systems, there are system operators whose job is to manage op-
eration of surviving components. In others, Adam Smith’s “invisible
hand” guides system users to discover and utilize surviving com-
ponents. And, the government may step in to preserve continuity
of public welfare by operating the surviving infrastructure. Current
fashion is to assess the consequence of damage to individual infras-
tructure components in dollars (replacement cost, or economic loss),
fatalities, or injuries, and to apply some measure of the vulnerability
to such damage and the threat that the damage will occur in some
epoch of time; these results are then used to prioritize components
of the infrastructure for defending or hardening. We hold that such
costs are largely irrelevant for the purposes of assessing the value of
infrastructure components because they do not reflect their marginal
contribution to system function. We quantify the consequence of a
disruption in terms of the combined, synergistic ability of any sur-
viving components to function as a damaged system, and we assess
how these components might be maximally damaged by an intelli-
gent adversary. We argue that an adversary’s attack strategy and
its consequence on the function of the target infrastructure should
be the output of such analysis, rather than a required input. We
demonstrate how to allocate limited defensive resources to maximize
the resilience of the system.
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Modern infrastructure systems (e.g., energy, communica-
tions, transportation, logistics), both public and private, sup-
port modern society’s most vital functions—delivery of goods
and services, financial transactions, health care, education,
government services, and even the military—and our depen-
dence on them makes their continued operation critical to our
physical, economic, and social well-being. For more than a
decade, there has been a general recognition that these criti-
cal infrastructure systems are vulnerable [1], a situation made
even more complicated because 85% of this infrastructure is
privately owned and/or operated [2].
Currently, managers of these systems have a difficult task:
“keep everything running and make sure nothing bad hap-
pens,” in the presence of growing system complexity, increas-
ing pressure to do more with scarce resources, and ongoing
disruptions from accidental failures (as in the case of the
Northeast blackout of 2006), natural disasters (as in Hurri-
cane Katrina), or intentional attack (as in the terrorist at-
tacks of 9/11). This challenge naturally leads to the perva-
sive questions, “which parts of an infrastructure are critical,”
“how critical are they,” and “how should we invest limited
resources to protect them?”
The intent of this paper is to present a quantitative, math-
ematically rigorous answer to these questions, with the intent
to inform managers of infrastructure systems. By managers,
we mean individuals who are ultimately charged with main-
taining the continuity of these systems—they could be system
operators, executives, or policy-makers. The key is that they
are responsible in some way for allocating limited resources
(possibly for operation, protection, or capacity expansion) in
order to preserve the function of these systems in case of com-
ponent casualties. We assume (we hope) these managers are
haunted by the question, “what’s the worst that can happen?”
and we show how to assess this, while simultaneously deter-
mining the best courses of action in preparation for, and in
response to, a disruption. We quantify the contribution of
individual components to the collective function of the sys-
tem, with the often necessary implication that the value of a
component depends on the function (or lack thereof) of other
components. Thus, there are not “critical components,” but
rather critical sets of components.
Unlike previous alternatives to assessing critical infra-
structures—including the fields of probabilistic risk analysis
(PRA) and traditional military defense planning—we propose
to model the behavior of an intelligent system operator who
uses domain-specific knowledge to manage system behavior in
the best possible way, even after the infrastructure has been
subjected to extreme disruption. We then model the behavior
of an intelligent adversary, who has perfect knowledge of the
system and its operation and who will choose a course of ac-
tion that maximizes the disruption to the system, anticipating
an optimal response by the system operator.
The implications of our results are far reaching. First and
foremost, we demonstrate that heuristic rules of thumb that
ignore the function of the system as a whole may provide
misleading assessments of what is critical to an infrastruc-
ture system. These findings demonstrate conclusively that
the “value” of a critical set of components needs to be an out-
put of the analysis, not an input. An important corollary is
that methods requiring inputs such as the “consequence” for
losing an individual component (even if provided by subject
matter experts) should be viewed with skepticism.
A second implication is that only rarely can infrastructure
components be organized into prioritized lists that appropri-
ately rank them according to their value. In military contexts,
such prioritized lists are commonly used for allocating limited
resources when attacking (or defending) infrastructure. The
idea is that if one can afford to attack (or defend) k targets,
then one simply takes the top k from the list. In practice,
this can lead planners to name a “most vital” target, which is
viewed as a requirement for attacking (or defending) in every
plan. However, our results demonstrate that such a prioritized
list of targets is overly restrictive: it prohibits the efficient use
of attack (or defense) resources. More specifically, a target
Authors’ Summary—We present a new paradigm for evaluating crit-
ical infrastructure that assesses the function of an infrastructure sys-
tem as a whole, rather than some enumeration of the vulnerability,
risk, economic replacement cost, size, or connectivity of each of its
components. Indeed, we hold that we can only discover the value of a
set of components if we model the function of the entire infrastructure
system both with and without the function of that set. Our results
call into question several currently-fashionable methods of risk anal-
ysis. For instance, probabilistic risk analysis was designed to model
Mother Nature, but is now used to treat terrorists as dice-throwers,
rather than intelligent goal-seeking decision makers, and replaces their
intelligence with probabilities that subject matter experts guess. Using
optimization-based models of system function, we identify the worst-
case disruptions to the intelligent operation of a system. We show how
to answer rigorously the questions “which parts of an infrastructure are
critical,” and “how should we allocate limited defensive resources in
order to minimize worst-case disruptions?”
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that is the most effective when attacked in isolation might not
be in any plan that targets two, or three, or more components
of the infrastructure simultaneously. Moreover, the difference
between the effectiveness of the optimal attack (or defense)
for each specific number of targets chosen, and one that fol-
lows “prioritized” planning guidance can be significant. There
is not necessarily one “most vital target.” Rather, there are
sets of vital targets, which depend on the resources available
to the defender, and the abilities of an attacker.
We present a simple, illustrative case study of an infras-
tructure and its intelligent operation, and we then use that
representation to answer the questions: what is the value of
the components of this infrastructure, and how can we make
the infrastructure less vulnerable to disruption?
The Seven Bridges of Ko¨nigsberg
In 1758, Leonhard Euler published a paper using as a moti-
vating example the propensity of city residents to traverse the
seven bridges of Ko¨nigsberg (see Fig. 1a) [3]. Using the graph
shown in Fig. 1b, Euler proved that no walking path exists
that crosses each bridge exactly once. We adapt this well-
















Fig. 1. The Seven Bridges of Ko¨nigsberg. (a) A drawing of the
seven bridges [4]. (b) In Euler’s graph representation, each vertex is a land mass
and each arc is a bridge. (c) We adopt a network representation that reflects the
bridges and the land distances between them: double arcs (bridges) are capacitated
and vulnerable; single arcs (roads) are uncapacitated and invulnerable.
Suppose we are worried that terrorists might attack and
destroy one or more of these bridges. How do we value these
bridges? If we have limited defensive resources, which bridges
should be defended? And, which bridges should be defended,
given the terrorists will know in advance of their attack about
our defensive disposition, and that intelligent, observant ter-
rorists will surely use that information to target our remaining
weaknesses?
We propose the following shift from the prevailing point
of view: the value of a bridge is not based on its replacement
cost, or its capacity, or its history. The value of a bridge, or,
more appropriately, a set of bridges, to Ko¨nigsberg can be
measured in terms of its ability to carry traffic. More gen-
erally, the value of a set of components of an infrastructure
is directly related to how it contributes to the function of that
infrastructure. If we can calculate the loss of system function-
ality as a consequence of losing any set of components, we call
that loss the value of that set of components.
Operation of the Ko¨nigsberg Bridge System
We start by offering a model for the behavior of the system un-
der normal operating conditions, which we call the operator’s
model. We emphasize that, in order to apply the technique
presented here, the system need not have an actual “opera-
tor.” The only requirement is that the system has a clearly
stated operating objective (e.g., maximize throughput, min-
imize cost) and that we represent any constraints affecting
how the system can operate (e.g., capacity limits, costs). The
purpose of the operator’s model is to reconcile the system
objectives (i.e., what the operator would like to do) with its
constraints (i.e., what the system can do) to determine how
the system will function under a given set of operating con-
ditions, which themselves are often parameterized (e.g., for a
particular resource budget).
For real infrastructure systems, operator models often ex-
ist that represent the “best practices” within a particular en-
gineering or industrial domain. When available, these mod-
els should be used or adapted, and we advise caution on the
invention of new abstract representations for system “func-
tion” that do not reflect operating reality. For example, when
considering the value of components in the electric power in-
frastructure, one ought to use industry standard models of
power-flow, as in [5, 6].
We assume that the Ko¨nigsberg bridges are built to con-
vey traffic, so we model the function of this system to carry
an assumed demand for traffic between river bank B and river
bank C. Specifically, consider nodes {Cc, Cd, Cg, Ba, Bb, Bf}
(Fig. 1c) and assume each node is the source of 10 travelers,
with 2 destined to each of the other five nodes. In this case,
the total demand for traffic is 60, of which there are 36 units
of traffic demand across the river. Assume bridges (denoted
by lower-case letters a,b,. . . ,f as in Fig. 1a) have capacities 20,
60, 100, 40, 80, 120, 40 respectively. Observe that the cross-
river capacity of this bridge system is 180 (considerably more
than the demand), this capacity is allocated over several re-
dundant bridges, and only a single bridge (bridge a) does not
have enough capacity to carry all cross-river traffic by itself.
In this problem, there are 30 different origin-destination
(O-D) pairs of locations. We assume that each traveler fol-
lows the shortest available path from his origin to destination,
and thus the system operates according to an “invisible hand”
that routes traffic over the network in a manner that satisfies
all supplies and demands and that also incurs the lowest total
travel cost. If we use the variable y to denote an “operating
plan” for the infrastructure system (e.g., the paths followed
by travelers over the network), the operator’s problem (or de-




where Y represents the set of all feasible paths that travel-
ers can follow (e.g., the number of travelers crossing any one
bridge cannot exceed its capacity), and the function f rep-
resents some measure of performance for the operating plan
(e.g., the total distance covered by all travelers). The func-
tion f(y) can be replaced by the expectation of f(y) if we find
that accurate results require representation of random behav-
ior. (We provide a complete formulation of this and all math-
ematical problems in the Supplementary Information, but we
suppress these details here to simplify our exposition.) Net-
work flow problems of this type developed into a mature field
during the 1950s-1970s and are now routinely taught at the
undergraduate level (e.g., [7]).
When solving (D) for Ko¨nigsberg, we assume a unit tran-
sit cost per traveler for each road or bridge segment traversed.
We allow for travelers to “stay at home” if the system does
not have the capacity to let them reach their destination, and
we assume the penalty cost of this is three times the longest
travel distance in the network. Note that the “operator” will
elect to have a traveler stay at home if the penalty cost is less
than the actual transit cost for that traveler. In either case,



































































Fig. 2. Optimal Operation of the Ko¨nigsberg Bridges. [color
online] (a) Utilization of each bridge under optimal flow. (b) Optimal routes followed
by 10 travelers leaving source location Cc; 2 travelers are destined for each of the
other 5 locations. (c) Individual traffic flows (each arrow denotes 2 travelers) denoted
by source and destination on bridge b.
set of traffic flows in the network, we have (total system cost)
= (total transit cost) + (total stay-at-home penalty cost).
In the absence of attack, the operator may use any of
the bridges to convey traffic. The minimum-cost solution in-
curs 156 units of transit cost and there is no dropped flow or
penalty. There are multiple traffic plans for which the sys-
tem achieves minimum cost, and one such optimal solution
appears in Fig. 2. While we cannot easily illustrate the indi-
vidual routes followed by each of the 60 travelers, we do anno-
tate the total utilization of each bridge to provide a sense of
congestion (Fig. 2a), the optimal routes followed by travelers
originating at location Cc (Fig. 2b), and the travelers whose
optimal routes take them across bridge b (Fig. 2c).
We can think of traffic for each O-D pair as a different
commodity that competes for network resources (here, bridge
capacity). Solving multicommodity flow problems of this type
can be computationally intensive, because the number of com-
modities grows quadratically in the number of O-D pairs, and
the number of potential paths for each commodity grows ex-
ponentially in the size of the network. While enumeration
can be used for small problems like the one shown here, it
becomes impractical for problems of even modest size. For-
tunately, there is a large literature on algorithms for solving
such problems efficiently (e.g. [7]).
Optimal Attack of Ko¨nigsberg Bridges
We can model maximally disruptive attacks on an infrastruc-
ture system through a bi-level mathematical program of this






where xk = 1 if component k of the network is “interdicted”
(attacked and destroyed), and xk = 0 otherwise; x ∈ X rep-
resents a reasonable set of resource constraints on an attacker
and the fact that attacks are binary; y ∈ Y denotes restric-
tions on any operating plan. The objective function represents
a cost function of the same form as f(y) in (D), above, but,
as the notation implies, involves coefficients that depend on
the specific values of x chosen by the attacker. This formula-
tion can represent a range of possible attacks, including but
not limited to partial or complete bridge destruction (e.g.,
kinetic weapon), bridge obstruction (e.g., blockade), or the
creation of delays and/or system congestion—anything that
can be represented by a mixed integer linear program. The
inner minimization still represents a system operator, a set
of automated protocols, or a “defender” that will identify the
best way to operate the system depending on the state of the
network. The outer maximization assumes that an “attacker”
understands how the defender operates his system and seeks
to inflict maximum harm to that system. These assumptions





























Fig. 3. Optimal Attack of the Ko¨nigsberg Bridges. [color
online] Attacking any one of four bridges yields the best 1-arc attack, but there is
only a single best 2-arc attack. There are two best 3-arc attacks, corresponding to
cutsets across the river.
associated with standard risk analysis, such as the need to
specify unknowable probabilities, such as the probability that
each component will be attacked and the corresponding suc-
cess probabilities.
Problem (AD) (short for “attacker-defender”) defines a
type of Stackelberg game [10] that has been extensively stud-
ied for analyzing vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure (e.g.,
[11, 5, 12, 13, 6]) and has served as the mathematical basis
for more than 130 infrastructure vulnerability “red team” ex-
ercises by military officer students at the Naval Postgraduate
School. We document some illustrative insights from these
case studies in [14].
We assume the attacker has a limited ability to interdict
arcs, represented here by a maximum number of binary at-
tacks. An attack on an arc increases transit costs sufficiently
to reduce arc flow to zero. We consider first the case of an
attack involving only a single arc: what is the optimal 1-arc
attack? It turns out that an attack on any of the four bridges
connecting the “big” island to the riverbank (i.e., bridges a, b,
c, or d) will yield an equivalently maximal disruption—when
each affected O-D flow re-routes to its destination, the total
transit cost increases from 156 to 168. Note that while there
are four maximally-disruptive bridges, they do not include the
bridge with the largest capacity (i.e., bridge f, with capacity
120). By comparison, attacking either bridge between the
“small” island and the riverbank (i.e., bridges f or g) yields a
total transit cost of only 164, and attacking the bridge con-
necting the two islands (i.e., bridge e) does not increase the
transit cost at all above the initial 156. Fig. 3 shows a rank-
ordered list of optimal attack strategies and their outcomes.
A more interesting, and less intuitive result arises when
one considers attacks involving multiple arcs. In the case
where the attacker can attack two bridges, the single best
strategy is to attack bridges b and f (Fig. 3), which reduces
the total cross-river transit capacity to 20. Attacking these
two bridges prevents 16 units of cross-river traffic from reach-
ing its destination, and this additional penalty gives rise to
a total system cost of 296. By contrast, the next best 2-arc
attack combinations (bridges c-d or a-b) do not prevent flows
from reaching their destinations but merely increase the tran-
sit cost, resulting in a total system cost of 212. If the attacker
can attack 3 bridges, then the optimal strategy is to create a
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cutset (either a-b-f or c-d-g), thus interdicting all 36 units of
cross-river flow and yielding a total system cost of 464. Ad-
ditional attacks beyond 3 bridges do not yield any increased
consequence in terms of traffic.
The optimal solution to (AD) considers all possible attack
strategies, each of which anticipates the optimal response of
the system operator. For a system comprised of N vulnerable






possible combinations to analyze. When
solving problems of real size, we must resort to sophisticated
mathematical techniques that obtain provably optimal solu-
tions with considerably less work than exhaustive enumeration
(e.g., [12]).
Solving (AD) for the possibility of up to m attacks allows
one to explore systematically when and where we can write
the optimal attack strategy as a prioritized list. In the worst








the attacker, prioritization is convenient when possible, but
assuming that the optimal attack strategy can be prioritized
is dangerous.
For Ko¨nigsberg, of the bridges that can participate in the
optimal 1-arc attack (a, b, c, d), only one of them is the sub-
ject of the optimal 2-arc attack (b-f). Thus, a myopic (pri-
oritized) attack strategy that uses either bridges a, c, or d
as the optimal 1-arc attack would yield a suboptimal 2-arc
attack (a-b, c-d, or d-c, respectively). The non-monotonicity
observed here is consistent with results that we have seen for
larger systems, and for this network with (more realistic) non-
uniform arc costs, we have observed cases in which there is no
monotonic set of attacks. In general it is our experience that
monotonic optimal attack strategies are the exception rather
than the rule. The implication is that one should generally
expect a prioritized attack list to be suboptimal, except in spe-
cial cases, and identifying if and when this happens requires
explicit analysis.
Optimal Defense of Ko¨nigsberg Bridges
Consider now the ability of the system operator to take some
preliminary defensive action in advance of an attack. These
actions can include either the hardening of individual bridges
(to make them invulnerable) or creating additional capacity
within the network—in general, they can be anything that af-
fects the operating constraints (e.g., costs, capacities) of the
system. We assume that the operator has a limited budget
for implementing such preliminary actions and also that any
actions taken will be observed by the intelligent adversary
prior to the attack. In practice, infrastructure expenditures
are public and easily viewed, and we assume conservatively
that the enemy will know how we have protected ourselves.
The question becomes: what defensive actions, when observed
by the adversary, will minimize the worst-case disruption that
the adversary can inflict with a maximally disruptive attack?
To answer this question, we formulate and solve a tri-level








We assume for each component k that we will choose exactly
one defensive strategy d ∈ D (note that one of the strategies
could be “do nothing”), and thus denote vdk = 1 if component
k of the network is “defended” using strategy d, and vdk = 0
otherwise; v ∈ V represents a reasonable set of resource con-
straints on available defensive options and the fact that de-
fense choices are binary; y ∈ Y(v) now denotes the set of al-
lowable traffic patterns based on the defended (or constructed)
components. The objective function f(y|v, x) represents the
total system cost of traffic flows, y, given defensive strategy,
v, and attack strategy, x. This formulation allows for a range
of defensive actions, including but not limited to partial or
complete bridge “hardening” (reinforcement), inspection of
travelers (checkpoints), or building new bridge capacity (con-
struction). Again, this function has the same structure as f(y)
in problem (D), but contains coefficients that depend, either
directly or indirectly, on the v and x chosen by the defender,
and then the attacker, respectively.
Solving (DAD) can be challenging in practice. In the
simple case of “hardening” actions that make a component
invulnerable, suppose the defender can afford to protect p







defend-then-attack combinations, each of which re-
quires the solution to the original operator’s problem (D). For
Ko¨nigsberg (N = 7), in the case of p = 2,m = 2 there are 210
total defend-then-attack combinations. However, for a larger
system with N = 100, p = 5,m = 5, there are more than 1015
combinations. Fortunately, a careful formulation facilitates a
mathematical decomposition that can be solved quickly for
problems of reasonable size (see Supplementary Information).
For our Ko¨nigsberg bridge example, we consider the abil-
ity to protect (i.e., make invulnerable) a limited number of
bridges. Fig. 4 presents the optimal strategies for each combi-
nation of possible defensive actions and attacks. For example,
when the defender can protect two bridges and the attacker
can attack two bridges, then the optimal defensive action is
to protect bridges b and d, and the corresponding optimal
attack strategy is to attack bridges a and c, which for the
residual network results in a total system cost of 180. Fig.
4 illustrates how in general the optimal defense and attack
strategies depend both on the capabilities of the attacker and
the defender—these strategies depend on sets of bridges that
might or might not be representable as a prioritized list.
Reading columns of Fig. 4 from top to bottom, we ob-
serve the decreasing marginal value of each subsequent defen-
sive action. Moreover, we observe that defending two bridges
in order to protect a single path across the river is sufficient
to guarantee that the system costs will remain low even in
the presence of worst-case attacks. Defending a third bridge
provides minimal benefit to the defender, while defending a
fourth bridge (at which point one can protect two paths across
the network) is beneficial. Defending more than four bridges
does not provide any additional benefit.
Alternate Approaches to Assessing Value (and Risk)
Rather than assess the value of infrastructure directly, as we
advise, it is currently fashionable to estimate the expected
loss value, or risk, where the consequence itself is measured
in, e.g., economic replacement cost or fatalities.
Our Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has pro-
moted Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for assessing the
threats posed by intelligent adversaries in a terrorist attack
[15]. In many cases, these models rely on the succinct def-
inition “Risk = Threat × Vulnerability × Consequence,”
where subject matter experts assess the threat and vulnera-
bility terms as independent probabilities, and the consequence
term in units of, e.g., economic replacement cost or fatalities.
The appeal here is simplicity, and the probabilities are con-
ventionally drawn as numeric values attached to colors (e.g.,
red, yellow, and green) assigned to cells in risk matrices. Re-
cent results savage these models, calling into question the as-
sumption that vulnerability and threat are independent, and
illustrating with a number of simple examples how they can
render ridiculous advice [16].
DHS has applied PRA specifically to assess the threat by




















































































Fig. 4. Optimal Attack and Defense of the Ko¨nigsberg Bridges. [color online] Defensive strategies are applied first and anticipate the optimal
attack strategies to follow. For each combination, we show the defended bridges (blue, with circles), the attacked bridges (red, with hashes), and the total minimized system
operating cost for the residual (damaged) system. Inset: Increase to system cost as a function of the number of attacks, for an optimal number and allocation of defended arcs.
ist attack [17]. The model is a 17-stage random event tree
with each stage modeled as the attacker or defender making
a random choice conditioned on preceding random choices,
and the final consequence in fatalities reckoned with epidemic
models. This requires elicitation of millions of probabilities
from subject matter experts based on data not known to sci-
ence. A recent National Research Council (NRC) report [17]
criticizes this model federation and suggests a number of cor-
rections and improvements, one of which is to abandon the
use of probabilities to predict the behavior of an intelligent,
goal-oriented terrorist decision maker. That report also offers
constructive alternatives in its appendices.
Decision trees may serve as an alternate to random event
trees (e.g., as suggested in [18] for bioterror modeling). These
models replace the random choice at each node of a PRA event
tree with 1) a decision to maximize an objective by choice of
branch to a successor node or 2) a random choice. Off-the-
shelf software can solve decision trees with a set of stated al-
ternate consequences using dynamic programming. Alternate
scenarios, governed by considerations such as resource limita-
tions on attacker and/or defender, can be posed and solved
this way, although there are an exponential number of such
scenarios and each must be exogenously designed in complete
detail.
Well-intentioned papers appeared in open academic liter-
ature soon after 9/11 suggesting a number of ways to model
terrorist behavior with probabilities (e.g., [19]). Military de-
fense planning long predates this work and advises creating
prioritized lists of objectives and pursuing these in priority
order until resources are exhausted. We do not recommend
this and are energetically trying to influence defense policy
makers to change this doctrine. Some military planning mod-
els assume complete secrecy can be maintained. In an age of
cellphone and web cameras, we think this is also ill advised.
Discussion
Our view of critical infrastructures holds continuity and cost
of continued system operation as key. The value of infras-
tructure has little, if anything, to do with economic replace-
ment cost to repair or replace individual system components.
Rather, it is entirely based on its contribution to the function
of that infrastructure. If the infrastructure is critical, we will
replace it, regardless of cost. What really matters, and what
we need to defend against is system disruption as a result of
component loss, catastrophic or otherwise.
The National Strategy for Homeland Security states: “We
must now focus on the resilience of the system as a whole—
an approach that centers on investments that make the system
better able to absorb the impact of an event without losing the
capacity to function” (p.28). By establishing system resilience
as the objective for investing in critical infrastructure security,
the NSHS makes an important point: the job of the infras-
tructure manager is not to estimate the most likely course of
adversary action so as to “catch the bad guy.” Rather, the
job of the infrastructure manager is to invest in the functional
capabilities of the system in order to deny consequences to the
adversary no matter his course of action. Our approach and
results proceed in direct support of this mandate.
An underlying, but fundamental point is that ignoring the
function of the infrastructure (e.g., by representing a complex
infrastructure with a simple graph) and/or its intelligent op-
eration yields results of limited practical value. Assessing the
vulnerability of real infrastructures requires domain-specific
models that capture these details. Our use of mixed integer
programming to formulate and solve these models means that
we are limited only by our imagination in the details that we
can represent.
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Our approach requires knowledge of the objectives and the
constraints for the system in question. It also requires some
understanding of how disruptions to system components will
impact the operational costs and/or constraints. We believe
such requirements pose little resistance for a qualified and se-
rious analyst. At the same time, we do not presume to know
in advance the impact of an attack on the system as a whole,
rather our models solve for this. The other required inputs are
an “attack budget” and a “defense budget.” While we may
not know the resources available to our adversary, we can sys-
tematically explore the potential damage that can be caused
for any assumed budget. Perhaps more importantly, we can
assess the optimal benefit for any defensive budget, actual or
proposed, which can be used to inform budget policy debates.
The assessment of the value of critical infrastructure we
present here is simplified to gauge only the instantaneous ef-
fects of attacks. Classical military modeling also evaluates
reconstitution time— i.e., the total loss of function until dam-
aged infrastructure is restored. We can address this (and have
in [20]) by including modeling of the way and the rate at which
damaged infrastructure can be replaced.
The following addresses some common questions about
our approach and the implications of our results.
What if the attacker chooses an attack that is suboptimal?
Some worry that a terrorist may not behave rationally, let
alone optimally. We respond, “Who cares?” Our results are
indifferent to this: any irrational adversary will do no more
damage than we anticipate, and therefore our defensive plans
will work at least as well as we project. I.e., we plan for an
intelligent adversary, and hope that if we have to encounter
a terrorist, he is an ignorant one who has not taken the time
to observe our defensive preparations. Protecting national in-
frastructure systems is an enormous endeavor, involving huge
sums of taxpayers’ money, investments that are widely de-
bated, published and quite visible. We are well-advised to
assume a terrorist reads the news before planning an attack.
What if the objective function of the attacker is not the
same as the system operator? Some worry that a terrorist
may have a different objective than we do—that he will not
act to maximize the damage to what we value. Again, we
respond, “Who cares?” Our calculation of the value of in-
frastructure is based on the function it performs; any other
“value” an attacker uses can only lead to less-damaging at-
tacks. If a terrorist follows some other objective than ours,
this is good news. And, our objective is to protect infrastruc-
ture, not catch terrorists by predicting their behavior.
If we can’t be certain where an attacker will strike, why
not use probabilities as inputs? Moreover, would the attacker
ever choose a mixed (i.e., probabilistic) strategy instead of a
pure (i.e., deterministic) one? Game theory and optimiza-
tion, for instance, incorporate as many details as we can gar-
ner about the limits on terrorist courses of action, and assess
as an output what goal-seeking terrorists would do. We can let
our attacker model suggest a mixed strategy by making the
terrorist decision x continuous, interpreting these decisions
as probabilities, and adding a constraint that his alternate
probabilities add to one. The results will provide an optimal
strategy (perhaps mixed, perhaps not) used deliberately to
keep the defender guessing. In this sense, probabilities of ter-
rorist behavior should be the output of analysis, not a required
input and they should not be used to represent our lack of
information about the attacker’s behavior.
How is this different from game theory? We do use game
theory, but not of the repeated, simultaneous play type; we
are solving an alternating play game with perfect information
that accommodates complicated constraints on the courses of
actions of the two adversaries, and therefore exhibits an enor-
mous state space for the opponents that could not easily be
represented in a “payoff table.” This is the power of using an
optimization model of the system operator.
What if the defender has the ability to hide his defensive
actions and/or operational strategies? Then we either have a
simultaneous-play, two person, zero-sum game [13] or a game
with imperfect information. Such models provide a way for a
defender or an attacker to assess the value of secrecy.
Conclusion
We have presented simple, complete experiments in this pa-
per, the results of which any interested reader can indepen-
dently verify. We have also applied models and methods like
these with real-world, highly-detailed, empirical data, and
have had to scale up to larger scope and finer fidelity. For ex-
ample, it is not lost on the authors that the San Francisco Bay
Area is also connected by seven bridges, and we have repli-
cated this analysis for this most realistic case study [20]. We
have confirmed, with theory and a lot of empirical experience,
that our declared principles hold in all these circumstances.
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Supplementary Information 
The defender’s problem is to choose components of his infrastructure to defend, (or build), in 
order to minimize the resulting worst-case damage an attacker could inflict upon it, where the 
“damage” is evaluated as the resulting minimum total cost of all traffic flows in the resulting 
network.  We state the defenders problem formally as a trilevel integer linear programming 
problem, DAD (for Defender-Attacker-Defender): 
 
Index use [~cardinality] 
n N∈   nodes, an ordinal set (alias p,i,j) [~15] 
( , )i j A∈    directed arcs (road segments) [~10] 
( , )i j R∈  undirected arcs ( i ) [~20] j<
( , ) ( , ) | ( , ) |i j A i j R i j j i R i j∈ ⇒ ∈ < ∨ ∈ >  
d D∈   defense options [~2] 
 
Given data [units] 
pnb   Supply ( ) or demand (<0) originating from origin p destined for n [persons] 0≥




= ∀ ∈∑ N
pnwc   Penalty cost of dropping demand at n originating from p [cost/person] 
pnqc   Penalty cost of exceeding capacity on arc ( , )i j A∈  [cost/person] 
attacks  maximum number of interdictions [cardinality] 
d




iju   capacity of directed arc (i,j) under defense option d D∈  [persons] 
d
ijq  increased cost if undirected arc ( ),i j R∈  attacked under defense option d D∈  
[operating cost/person] 
d
ijvc   cost to implement defense plan d on undirected arc ( ),i j R∈ [defense cost] 
vbudget  total budget available for defense plans [defense cost] 
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Decision variables [units, if applicable] 
d
ijV   =1 if defense option d chosen for undirected arc ( ),i j R∈ , 0 otherwise 
pnW   Surplus elastic variable for dropped demand at n from p [persons]  
ijX   1 if arc (  interdicted, 0 otherwise , )i j R∈
d
pijY  Flow of traffic originating from node p on arc ( , )i j A∈  under defense option 
 [persons] d D∈
d
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Discussion 
The objective function (DAD0) represents the total cost of operating the network, for a defense 
option chosen for each arc, an attack plan, and a set of flows in the resulting network.    We 
assume there is a “do nothing” defense plan, od D∈ , that grants each arc an “unprotected” arc 
cost, , capacity, , and interdiction penalty, .  (Note that this immediately provides a 







0odiju = ;  
This allows the creation of new arcs providing “redundant” capacity as a defense mechanism, as 
opposed to only being able to harden existing components of the network.)  Constraint (DAD1) 
restricts the choice of defense options to those whose total cost does not exceed the overall 
defense budget.  Constraints (DAD2) enforce balance of flow at each node, for each commodity.  
Constraints (DAD3)  restrict all arc flows to be nonnegative, and limit the total flow on 
undirected arc ( )  to not exceed the total capacity granted by the defense option chosen for 
that arc.  Constraints (DAD4) limit the defender to choosing exactly one defensive plan per arc.  
Constraints (DAD5) limit the total number of bridges an attacker can target.  Constraints 
(DAD6-DAD9) specify the type or the nonnegativity of the non-flow decision variables. 
,i j R∈
Note that for any fixed defense plan, , DAD simplifies to a bilevel integer programming 
problem of the form AD( ), and for a fixed defense and attack, , we have a simple minimum 
cost, multi-commodity flow problem D( , ) to solve for the resulting optimal traffic flows in 
the network.  This immediately suggests using a decomposition-based algorithm to solve DAD, 





[1]  Brown GG, Carlyle WM, Harney R, Skroch E, Wood RK (2008) Interdicting a Nuclear 
Weapons Project.  Operations Research, to appear.  
 
 
